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that may be changing from minute to
minute. The decision will be based on
instinct born of training, individual disposition and character, and the perception of immediate danger. These
perceptions were often as limited as
those of soldiers in any war. For all our
new technology, the fog of war descended as quickly and completely as a
desert sandstorm, and even on sunny
days and clear nights it could blank out
an individual’s surroundings beyond a
narrow range.
These are points worth having driven
home, and Wright’s descriptions of the
events he witnessed are vivid and often
moving. Some of the best writing is in
the quotations of the Marines of 2d
Platoon. When the Marines accidentally
shoot and kill an Iraqi child in her father’s car at a roadblock, a corporal
later states, “War is either glamorized—
like we kick their ass—or the opposite—
look how horrible, we kill all these civilians. None of these people know what it’s
like to be there holding that weapon.”
Wright’s book represents American war
writing in its maturity. He avoids the
pitfalls of glamorizing or moralizing.
Many of the Marines he writes about
are complex men. The staff sergeant
nicknamed “Iceman” is an efficient and
a somewhat emotionally remote professional fighting man who is also a sympathetic figure. It would be easy for
Wright to dislike General James N.
Mattis as a man of a different generation and completely different outlook,
especially once Wright learns that he
and the rest of Recon Battalion have
been functioning as a diversion, a virtual decoy, during the attack north. The
portrait of Mattis that emerges, however, is understanding and even admiring. Wright has the common sense to
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realize that sometimes leaders must risk
their own in war, and that he himself
must have the courage to accept his role
as a tactical pawn when his profession
as journalist requires it.
Recon units are different. They probably contain a higher percentage of the
“natural warrior” type than do other
Marine Corps units. These fine-tuned
combat thoroughbreds often come
across as sensitive and complex. Despite
the implications of the title, it is often
these young men, rather than the elders,
who display the greatest humanity and
restraint. The Marines of 2d Platoon
were sometimes surprised to find that
they preferred saving or preserving life
to taking it.
Make no mistake, these are the Marine
breed—“Generation M.” No apologies
are needed for the wars they fought. We
should be humbled and instructed by
their example. After the rush of combat
comes reflection, and after the battle is
the effort to restore and rebuild. Courage will always be required of soldiers
in war, but it is also required of us to be
wise, if we can.
REED BONADONNA

Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps

Saccone, Richard. Negotiating with North Korea.
Hollym International Corp., 2003. 215pp. $22.95

Perhaps the potentially most volatile
part of the world is North Korea. Talks
between the United States and North
Korea seem to be a series of impasses,
confrontations, brinkmanship, threats,
and blusters. The usual explanation for
this state of perpetual frustration for
U.S. negotiators is that they are dealing
with an enigmatic regime that has no
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regard for peaceful resolution of the
confrontations between it and the rest
of the world. This work provides an alternate path for understanding and
working toward more successful negotiations than has been the historical case
for over half a century.
Richard Saccone, retired U.S. Air Force,
alumnus of the Naval Postgraduate
School, has spent over fourteen years in
the Koreas. He has written six books on
Korea covering history, culture, tourism, and business, and he is well qualified to discuss the topic of negotiations.
He is a former representative for KEDO,
the Korean Peninsula Development Organization, building nuclear power
plants as required under the 1994
Agreed Framework between the United
States and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Saccone currently
teaches international relations and national government at St. Vincent’s College in Latrobe, Pennsylvania.
Saccone explains such concepts as Juche
(self-reliance), Kibun (spirit), and
Cheymyon (saving face) in a manner
that goes deeper than the caricaturelike definitions found in the common
press. Examination allows the reader to
appreciate that the concept of communication requires both sending and receipt of information and ideas by at
least two parties. When I was a college
student, I read an essay by the noted semanticist S. I. Hayakawa about denotation and connotation. Negotiating with
North Korea reveals that American negotiators may have been concentrating
on the denotative aspects of communication and neglecting the connotations.
It gives me hope that negotiations can
progress beyond the cultural misunderstanding and confrontational nature of
U.S.–North Korea relations.
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Fully half the book concerns itself with
the tactics used by North Korean negotiators. Saccone enumerates them in
forty specific categories, which include
threats, loaded questions, requests for
compensation, red herrings, and appeals for fairness. This by itself is useful,
but the author offers specific examples
and provides countertactics that will
help negotiations go forward to a mutually acceptable conclusion. The forty
specifics are grouped into eight general
headings: coercion, offensiveness, manipulation, assertiveness, confounding,
obstruction, persuasion, and cooperation. Understanding and appreciating
the analysis and advice provided by
Saccone should allow U.S. negotiators
greater success.
For example, one category, labeled “Lessons of History,” points out that North
Korean negotiators are generally much
better versed in past meetings and negotiations than American negotiators,
who tend to be constantly rotated.
Saccone provides the following advice,
“The best counter to lessons from history is another lesson of history. This
requires considerable preparation.
U.S. negotiators are notoriously ignorant of history. If one is ignorant of the
record you cannot even be sure that
what the opponent is quoting is correct.
Do your homework and counter history
with lessons of your own choosing.”
Saccone’s advice appears obvious, but
the United States too often neglects to
heed the obvious.
This work should be required reading
for all who must deal with North Korea.
Saccone understands its negotiating behavior. He distinguishes between myths
and reality, and offers alternatives to
improve U.S.-Korea relations. However, this work should not be confined

2

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

170

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Maruyama: Negotiating with North Korea,

The essays in this collection were written for an international conference held
in honor of the late Michael J. Handel
at the U.S. Naval War College. Handel
wrote several seminal pieces in the relatively new field of intelligence studies,
and his colleagues are to be complimented for producing this impressive
Festschrift. Betts and Mahnken put together an impressive group of practitioners and academics to write on various
aspects of the work of intelligence
agencies. It begins with four articles of
a theoretical nature, followed by three
articles that focus on historic case
studies.

situation additional noise. Handel also
stresses the paradox of estimating risk.
The riskier a military course of action,
the less a rival anticipates and prepares
for it, paradoxically making its eventual
adoption less risky. Handel also suggests that successive intelligence successes increase not only the agency’s
credibility but also the risk of strategic
surprise, because its conclusions will
be less subject to critical questioning.
There is also the self-negating prophecy. A warning of an impending attack
triggers military preparations that in
turn prompt the enemy to delay or cancel his plans. Such a scenario makes it
almost impossible even in retrospect to
know if the military preparations were
warranted. Another scenario that may
lead to a strategic surprise is a quiet
international environment that may
be used to conceal the preparations
for an attack. Following a fascinating
analysis of the problems of perception, the politics of intelligence, and
the organizational and bureaucratic
features, Handel reaches the realistic
conclusion that surprise is almost always unavoidable.

This volume appropriately opens with a
classic by Handel on strategic surprises,
published almost thirty years ago,
which serves as an excellent introduction to a book devoted to intelligence.
It is typical of Handel’s general thinking
on strategic affairs, pointing out several
paradoxes inherent to the potential for
strategic surprise that have become the
common wisdom of the intelligence
field. Handel claims that due to the
great difficulties in differentiating between “noise” and “signals” (relevant
information), all data amounts to noise,
making the collection of additional
information designed to clarify the

The second article, by editor Richard K.
Betts, starts with the unconventional
premise that politicization of intelligence services is not necessarily bad,
and sometimes it is even advisable.
Betts presents two opposing models of
intelligence work. The first portrays
the intelligence agency striving to
achieve professional credibility by presenting thorough analysis, while the
second depicts the intelligence organization stressing the supply of data that
is useful and relevant to decision makers. In the second case, the managers
of intelligence organizations make
compromises and tailor the information

only to those involved with North Korea. Anyone involved in negotiations
will benefit from this book.
XAVIER K. MARUYAMA

Monterey, California

Betts, Richard K., and Thomas G. Mahnken, eds.
Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence: Essays in Honor
of Michael J. Handel. London: Frank Cass, 2003.
210pp. $114.95
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